

by adding after paragraph (2) the following new paragraph:

(3) Under the authority of subsection (a)(1)(B)(i), the Secretary shall provide for demonstration projects, in at least three States and at least one of which is located in a rural area, which relate to the provision of preventive health services (including health screening, referral, and health education) to the elderly throughout the State through traveling health care practitioners (other than physicians, but including public health nurses) who provide such services in or through different public and private nonprofit facilities (including churches, schools, and senior citizen centers). The Secretary shall report to Congress on the results of such demonstration projects not later than three years after the date of the enactment of this paragraph."

UNAUTHORIZED EXAMINATION OF SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS MATERIALS

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. STOKES) is recognized for 30 minutes.

Mr. STOKES. Mr. Speaker, recent newspaper and other media accounts have carried the story that materials in the possession of the former Select Committee on Assassinations were examined in an unauthorized fashion last summer. As the former chairman of the select committee, I am making these remarks to report to my colleagues the facts of the matter.

The Select Committee on Assassinations faced an important and complex task. The House mandated the committee to look into the facts and circumstances surrounding the deaths of two of our Nation's greatest leaders, President John F. Kennedy and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.

Death is not a pleasant subject, and its details can be gruesome. One of the least pleasant of the tasks that faced the committee was the examination of the photographs made during the autopsies of these two men. Anyone who knew them in life would be disturbed viewing their photographs in death.

The photographs that were made in connection with the autopsies of President Kennedy and Dr. King have never been made public. Good taste dictates that they never be. The Warren Commission that examined President Kennedy's death in 1964 did not publish them, and the select committee's final report on the deaths of President Kennedy and Dr. King will also not make the photographs of either of them public.

Mr. Speaker, the Select Committee on Assassinations took extraordinary care that the autopsy photographs were not used in an unauthorized fashion.

There are segments of the press that are so lacking in good taste that they might well have published them if they could have obtained access to them. The select committee made every effort to employ only the most trustworthy persons, but even then, only those with a need to use the autopsy photographs in their work were given access to them.

The autopsy materials were kept in a separate safe in the security room of the offices of the select committee. The

committee's classified files were kept in the same room, but in separate safes. The general files of the committee were housed in another area entirely. It was necessary to sign in and out on a log-book to secure access to classified files. Access to the autopsy materials could only be secured by the personal permission of the chief counsel given separately every time access was sought.

Each notebook that contained a set of the autopsy photographs was separately numbered and the use of each book was recorded on a log every time it was examined.

In July of last year the staff of the select committee discovered that a Central Intelligence Agency employee had obtained unauthorized access to the autopsy photographs of President Kennedy. The staff made this discovery with the assistance of the District of Columbia Police, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Central Intelligence Agency. The facts are as follows:

A researcher on the Assassinations Committee staff secured permission of the chief counsel to get access to the Kennedy autopsy materials. Access was obtained in the morning. The materials were taken from the safe, and the safe door was closed but not locked. They were to be used in another room by the committee's medical artist to prepare drawings of the President's wounds.

When he returned later that day to return the photographs, he found that the safe had been opened and another notebook had been taken out of the safe. One photograph of the President that was enclosed in a plastic cover had been ripped out of the notebook and the photograph taken out of its cover.

The chief counsel of the committee was immediately notified and he ordered the staff to undertake an investigation to determine who had obtained unauthorized access to the materials. The fingerprints of each member of the staff who had authorized access to the safe were matched against fingerprints that were lifted from the books that had been removed from the safe, the plastic covers in the books, and the inside of the safe door. None of the staff fingerprints matched the lifted fingerprints. The fingerprints of a Central Intelligence Agency employee were then matched to the lifted prints.

The match was made by the District of Columbia Police and double checked by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Mr. Speaker, this matter was handled by the District of Columbia Police and the Federal Bureau of Investigation in a competent and confidential fashion and the committee is grateful to them for their assistance.

To understand how the Central Intelligence Agency employee obtained access to the safe it is necessary to understand the role he played with the committee. The select committee had access at the Central Intelligence Agency to the agency's classified files. Notes were taken by the staff on the files. Those notes were brought by an agency courier under seal to a special area in the committee's offices where they were locked in a safe to which only the Central Intelli-

gence Agency had the combination. Nothing else was kept in that room. An agency employee was available during working hours in the room to give the staff access to the notes. The safe could only be opened in the presence of the Agency employee and a staff member. If it was necessary to use the Agency notes in connection with a regular file of the committee, the regular file was brought to the special area. If it was necessary to use the committee's classified files in connection with the staff notes either the classified file would be brought to the special area or the staff notes were brought to the classified files in the security room. The Agency employee always accompanied the staff notes if they were removed from the special area. But the Agency employee was not authorized to be out of the special area unless he was accompanied by a staff member. He was not authorized to have access to the autopsy materials.

When the Agency employee's fingerprints were matched to the lifted fingerprints, permission was obtained from the Agency to interview the Agency employee. The employee's permission was obtained to record the interview. The employee denied having access to the autopsy materials when he was interviewed on one day. He was then interviewed a second time on a succeeding day. He did not admit any wrongdoing. He refused to be interviewed any more.

The Central Intelligence Agency conducted an investigation of the matter. Its investigation began after the committee asked permission to talk to the employee and before the committee brought the details of the unauthorized action, including the fingerprints, to the Agency's attention. The Agency's investigation included interviews and the use of photographs.

Additional photographs were taken after the details of the committee's investigation were brought to the attention of the Agency. The committee was given access to everything that the Agency obtained in its investigation and certain additional materials that the committee requested.

The committee staff members who conducted the investigation are satisfied that there was no evidence uncovered that the Agency directed the employee to obtain access to the autopsy materials. They also believe on the basis of what they know that the Agency did not direct the activity of the Agency employee in this regard. The Agency employees who conducted the Agency's investigation are satisfied that the motive for obtaining unauthorized access was mere curiosity. The committee staff members are not satisfied that the motive has been established; they believe mere curiosity is not consistent with the fingerprint evidence. But in the absence of a full and truthful confession by the Agency employee or the others, if any, who were in league with him—or substantial new evidence all recognize that the matter of motive cannot be ultimately resolved.

Mr. Speaker, I wish to emphasize several points:

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CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL



First. No evidence was uncovered that anything was taken.

Second. No evidence was uncovered that anything was misused, other than in the unauthorized examination itself.

Third. No evidence was uncovered that anyone has profited from these acts.

Fourth. No evidence was uncovered that anyone other than the employee himself was involved in what he did.

Fifth. The employee has been discharged from the Agency; and

Sixth. To my knowledge, no disciplinary action has been thought necessary or taken against any other Agency employees in connection with the incident.

Mr. Speaker, I do not know what additional action can be taken in this matter. I considered it closed in July 1978 after the committee and the Agency did all they reasonably could be expected to do. I consider it closed now. Nevertheless, if the House or any of its relevant committees seeks to inquire into the matter further, I will assist in any way possible. It is enough to add that speculation about the matter beyond the evidence at hand is unjust to all concerned. No one wishes to know the truth more than I do. But the irresponsible circulation of rumor and myth only feed paranoia; they do not quench the thirst for knowledge.

At this point I include the following:

[From the Washington Post, June 18, 1979]

CIA OFFICER RIFLED FILES OF KILL PANEL

(By George Lardner, Jr.)

The House Assassinations Committee discovered last summer that its most sensitive files had been rifled, and then traced fingerprints on them to an officer of the CIA, according to informed sources.

The incident involved surreptitious entry of a combination safe at the congressional committee's offices, the sources said. The safe was reserved for physical evidence of President Kennedy's assassination, including the autopsy photos, X-rays and other articles, such as the so-called "magic bullet" that wounded both Kennedy and Texas Gov. John B. Connally.

Apparently nothing had been taken, but the sources said, there was no doubt that the files in the safe had been tampered with. For instance, they said the autopsy photos of the head shot that killed Kennedy had been taken out of their slip cases and were left in disarray inside the three-drawer safe.

"It looked as though someone had just run out," one source said.

After several inquiries by a reporter this week, the CIA acknowledged that it has dismissed the individual in question, but indicated that it plans no further action.

"We're satisfied that it was just a matter of curiosity [on the individual CIA officer's part]," said CIA spokesman Herbert Hetu. Asked whether it might have been a matter of conscious CIA spying on a congressional committee, Hetu replied, "Good lord, no."

The unauthorized entry was discovered when committee staffers arrived at work early one morning last summer, probably in July sources said.

"Blakey [the House committee's chief counsel, G. Robert Blakey] was told right away," one source recounted. "Only three or four people were supposed to have access to that safe. And I understand that one of them said he'd locked it the night before."

Fingerprint experts from the D.C. police department, where several committee staffers had old friends, were called in. By then, someone had thoughtlessly had the documents rearranged neatly, so that there were other

prints on them and on the safe. But the security-conscious committee reportedly had fingerprint records of everyone who worked there, both those with access to the safe and those who had no business being there.

Sources said the only unauthorized set of prints the police found belonged to Regis T. Blahut, a CIA liaison officer who had been detailed to assist the committee with the CIA records it needed for its investigations.

"His fingerprints were all over the place," one source reported. "On the photos, inside the safe, and on all sorts of different packages."

Particularly telling, another source indicated, was the fact that some of the prints were found on autopsy photos themselves rather than the plastic sleeves in which they had been encased.

The episode reportedly produced a great wave of anxiety within the CIA, which has been claiming for several years that it has learned its lessons and that its domestic spying and misdeeds are a relic of the past. In any case, the agency launched an intensive internal investigation, including polygraph examinations of Blahut and perhaps a number of his superiors.

In a brief telephone interview with The Washington Post, Blahut denied any wrongdoing. He acknowledged that his fingerprints had been found on the documents in question, but insisted that there was an innocent explanation. He refused, however, to say what that was.

"There's other things that are involved that are detrimental to other things," he said. Asked what he meant by that, he refused to elaborate.

"I signed an oath of secrecy [with the CIA]," he said. "I cannot discuss it any further."

Sources quoted Blakey, who was kept informed of the CIA's in-house inquiry, as having stated on several occasions that Blahut had been given three polygraph examinations in all and that he had failed them in important respects.

"He denied he did it, and he flunked that," one source said. "They also asked him whether anyone ordered him to do it. He said no one, and he flunked that."

Blahut, who said he worked for the CIA office of security, insisted that he had come through the tests with his credibility unblemished.

"I've already defended myself to my employers," he said when asked about the incident. "As far as I'm concerned, that's all cleared up."

Blakey, who has been working on the now moribund Assassination Committee's final report in recent weeks, refused to comment. Sources said he seized on the incident last year and used it as leverage to get the CIA to cough up a number of documents it had been holding back from the committee. Some of the records reportedly pertained to Lee Harvey Oswald's visit to Mexico City in September 1963.

"There was a marked improvement," one former staffer recalled. "All of a sudden, they were giving us everything we wanted. Blakey kept saying he wanted to go slow, to let them [the CIA] conduct the investigation. . . . But I think he'd have to admit we wanted better cooperation."

Asked one question after another about the incident, including the identification of the CIA officer's fingerprints, Blakey kept saying: "I won't discuss the matter." Asked if he would deny it, he said, "No."

Most members of the House committee apparently were kept in the dark. Even the chairman of the subcommittee that investigated the Kennedy assassination, Rep. Richardson Preyer (D-N.C.), said he was unaware of it when queried by a reporter. Later, after checking with Chairman Louis Stokes (D-Ohio), Preyer declined to comment beyond saying:

"Blakey and Lou [Stokes] were handling the CIA stuff. I don't have my nose out of joint about it. Talk to Lou."

Stokes declined to talk. "The matter was terminated," he said. "There's no need for me to comment."

It was not clear what other CIA officials might have been given polygraph tests before the inquiry was dropped although sources said that one of Blahut's superiors, Scott Breckinridge of the CIA inspector general's office, had been expected to be given one. There were also reports that CIA Deputy Director Frank Carlucci had offered "in a magnanimous way" to take one.

Breckinridge is a veteran CIA official who served as the agency's chief liaison officer with the Senate Intelligence Committee during its 1975-76 investigations of the intelligence community. He also wrote the top-secret CIA inspector general's report in 1967 on CIA assassination plots against Cuban Premier Fidel Castro.

Breckinridge retired recently. He could not be reached for comment. CIA spokesman Hetu said his retirement had nothing to do with the rummaging of the House committee's safe.

As for Carlucci, Hetu told a reporter, "He doesn't remember having said what you said," he said.

[From the Washington Post, June 19, 1979]

CIA PROBE INTO RIFLED FILES CALLED SUPERFICIAL, SELF-SERVING

(By George Lardner, Jr.)

The Central Intelligence Agency's investigation of the rifling last year of a congressional committee's files by one of its officers was aimed primarily at getting the CIA off the hook, according to informed sources.

"They investigated it to get out of it themselves, not to find out whether somebody else was involved," said one knowledgeable source.

The Washington Post reported yesterday that the most sensitive files of the House Assassinations Committee had been rifled last summer by a CIA liaison officer who had been assigned to help the committee.

The CIA responded by saying that the officer in question, Regis T. Blahut, had been dismissed. CIA spokesman Herbert Hetu said the agency was "satisfied" that the incident had been simply "a matter of curiosity" on Blahut's part.

Sources close to the committee sharply disputed the CIA's assertions. One said "the circumstantial [evidence] is overwhelming" that more than "curiosity" was involved.

CIA officer Blahut, this source said, "went into a room where he wasn't supposed to be without one of our officers being present."

There, the source said:

"He opened a safe, and pulled out a drawer.

"He took a ring-binder notebook out of the drawer, he ripped a plastic case out of the notebook and he took a picture out of the plastic case.

"He fled when he heard a noise, and then he lied about it."

According to this source, both CIA Director Stansfield Turner and CIA Deputy Director Frank Carlucci were informed bluntly by the committee's chief counsel, G. Robert Blakey, of what the committee regarded as the shortcomings of the CIA inquiry.

Hetu denied this. In a telephone interview yesterday, he also denied that the CIA had conducted a shortsighted, self-protective investigation. "We did check outside and inside [the agency]," he said.

Hetu also maintained that Blahut had every right to be in the room where the safe was located.

The rifled safe was reserved for physical evidence from the Kennedy assassination and, at the time, contained at least the grisly autopsy photos. The safe containing

CIA records and other materials that Blahut was supposed to safeguard was in another room, sources said.

Committee staffers discovered the incident one afternoon last July after a committee lawyer had gone into the room, with Blakey's permission, to inspect some of the autopsy photos. He left the room briefly to speak with Blakey and returned to discover that one of the notebooks he had not touched was out of place.

"If it were just curiosity, why should you have to take photos out of an unused book in order to see them? Why not just look at them?" one source said.

As for Blakey, sources said, he had always been "paranoid" about the possibility that some of the gruesome Kennedy autopsy photos might get out and destroy the committee's reputation.

"No one who has seen those photos would have any doubt that they should not be made public," one source said. "The one thing that would have done us [the House Assassinations Committee] in would have been for those photos to be publicly released. We were never satisfied that someone else wasn't involved."

Of the CIA's investigation, one source said, "all they investigated was whether he [Blahut] had any connection with the agency [in doing what he did] . . . They asked [Blahut] on a polygraph [examination] whether he had any connection with the agency in doing what he did. And he passed when he said he didn't have any connection. But they didn't ask whether someone else had authorized him to do it."

Turner enunciated the agency's view yesterday afternoon in one of his "Director's Notes" to all CIA employees: "A media report today suggests that there was something sinister involving the agency and the files of the House Assassinations Committee. I want to assure you that this is simply not the case. Our investigations revealed an error in judgment by a contract employee as a custodian for CIA material with the committee. He acted alone and out of curiosity and was dismissed."

[From the Washington Star, June 18, 1979]
CIA FIRES OFFICER WHO RIFLED FILES

A CIA security officer, found to have sorted through sensitive files of the House Assassinations Committee, has been fired, an agency spokesman said last night.

The security officer, Regis Blahut, was assigned to guard CIA documents being used by the committee in its investigation of the assassination of President John Kennedy, said spokesman Herbert Hetu. "He saw the committee's files and picked them up, which was dumb," Hetu said.

After an internal CIA investigation, he said, "we were totally convinced" Blahut was not encouraged "from outside or inside the CIA" to examine private committee documents.

"That would be the immediate question, but we felt certain it was just a matter of curiosity and poor judgement," Hetu said. "We dismissed the guy and that was it."

A Washington Post story in today's editions quoted unnamed sources as saying the incident involved "surreptitious entry of a combination safe at the committee's offices," but Hetu said no safe was involved as far as he knew.

The Post said the safe was reserved for physical evidence of the Kennedy assassination, including autopsy photos, X-rays and the bullet said to have hit Kennedy and Texas Gov. John B. Connally.

There are no allegations that anything was taken.

Blahut could not be reached for comment last night, but The Post quoted him as acknowledging that his fingerprints had been found on some of the documents. However,

he denied any wrongdoing, citing a CIA "oath of secrecy" in declining to elaborate, the newspaper said.

[From the Washington Post, June 28, 1979]
HOUSE PROXING CIA 'BABYSITTER' WHO RIFLED FILES ON JFK

(By George Lardner, Jr.)

The House Intelligence Committee has started an investigation of a CIA officer's snooping last year in the offices of another congressional committee.

Members of the Intelligence Committee, which has oversight authority over the CIA, were informed of the inquiry last week by Chairman Edward Boland (D-Mass.). Committee staffers had already interviewed the CIA's director of security, Robert Gambino, about the incident following a report in The Washington Post.

The Post, quoting informed sources, reported that the most sensitive files of the House Assassinations Committee had been rifled last summer and fingerprints on them traced to a CIA liaison officer assigned to the committee.

The assignment, it has since been learned, was made under a CIA program code-named "MH/Child," which sources described as encompassing a variety of so-called "babysitting" chores.

The agency dismissed the liaison officer in question, Regis T. Blahut, last August and then dropped the matter. In a memo to all CIA employees last week, CIA Director Stansfield Turner took the position that Blahut had "acted alone and out of curiosity."

Since then, the CIA has also been insisting that Blahut, who had been employed by the agency's Office of Security, did not rifle the Assassinations Committee's files and did not even enter the safe where the files were kept.

However, the agency has refused to say what it thinks did happen, beyond describing it as—in the words of CIA spokesman Herbert Hetu—"something dumb."

According to informed sources, the incident took place one afternoon last July after an Assassinations Committee staffer had started inspecting some of the materials in a combination safe reserved for physical evidence of the 1963 assassination of President Kennedy.

Sources said he took what he wanted and left the room. According to one version, he left the safe door closed but unlocked; according to another, the safe door might have been left slightly ajar. In any case, sources said, when he returned, he found a book of Kennedy autopsy photos inside the safe in obvious disarray.

Blahut's fingerprints were found on the inside door of the safe. They were also found on one of the gruesome autopsy photos, which had been taken out of its plastic case, sources said. The plastic case itself had been torn from its notebook binder.

The CIA's Hetu, however, declares that Blahut "did not enter the safe to get the notebook."

Asked how it was then that Blahut's fingerprints were found on the inside of the safe door, Hetu said this must have happened when Blahut was "putting it [the book of photos] back in the safe."

Asked why Blahut would do that if he hadn't taken the book from the safe to begin with, the CIA spokesman said, "I don't know. Ask Blahut."

Hetu also declined to give the CIA's version of what happened, insisting that it would serve "no purpose."

Blahut, who reportedly failed CIA polygraph tests in several important respects concerning the incident, declined to comment. He has said there is an innocent explanation, but he has refused to say what that is.

Sources said there were at least three

personnel shifts and changes within the CIA's Office of Security following the incident last summer and the recent publicity over it, affecting, among others, Blahut's immediate supervisor. Hetu said there was no connection.

"We're satisfied that what he [Blahut] did, he did on his own," the CIA spokesman told a reporter. "None of the things [personnel shifts and resignations] you've described had anything to do with that. . . . We're satisfied the guy did something dumb. He looked at a book he wasn't supposed to look at. And we fired him after we assured ourselves that he wasn't tasked [to do what he did] by anyone either inside or outside the agency."

Sources close to the committee maintained that the CIA's investigation was aimed primarily at getting the agency off the hook and was not thorough enough to eliminate suspicions that more than "curiosity" might have been involved.

Blahut had been assigned to help the Assassinations Committee with the CIA files it needed in its inquiries. Sources described the MH/Child project, under which the assignment came, as a sort of "babysitting" function that also includes escorting visitors to the CIA headquarters building at Langley.

□ 2230

NRTA-AARP SETS LEGISLATIVE PRIORITIES FOR 1979

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. PEPPER) is recognized for 5 minutes.

● Mr. PEPPER. Mr. Speaker, the National Retired Teachers Association and the American Association of Retired Persons are widely recognized organizations concerned with the welfare of older Americans. These organizations have recently published their 1979 legislative policy and 1979-80 joint State legislative committee policy guidelines. This year's program emphasizes the importance of the demographic, economic and employment trends in terms of legislative policy for current and future retirees and the Government programs which assist them. The National Retired Teachers Association and the American Association of Retired Persons represent over 12 million members and emphasize that as the older population expands and changes, Federal programs must respond.

Because I would like to share some highlights of their national legislative objectives with my fellow Congressmen, I would ask that the following article be inserted in its entirety at this point in the Record:

THE 1979 NRTA-AARP LEGISLATIVE PRIORITIES ECONOMIC POLICY

As inflation is our major economic problem, steps must be taken to reduce drastically the annual rate and provide the elderly with an increased measure of compensation for the inflation losses they suffer.

To these ends, the federal government should coordinate monetary and fiscal policies, reduce government spending, balance the federal budget, strongly enforce anti-trust policy, deregulate those economic sectors where price competition would be improved, promote competition and productivity, use economic "controls" where necessary (as in the health sector) and develop innovative "tools" to use in the fight against inflation.